Abstract
Current quantum networks remain difficult to scale because quantum components are noisy, expensive, and resource constrained, which limits the practical security advantages they can provide over classical network infrastructure. Quantum-augmented networks address this challenge by selectively integrating quantum primitives into classical communication systems. Within this setting, quantum anonymous notification provides a way to inform a receiver of an incoming quantum communication without exposing unnecessary metadata. In this work, we propose an improved quantum anonymous notification protocol that uses rotation operations on shared Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger states to generate anonymous notifications in an n-user quantum-augmented network. We evaluate the protocol under channel-noise conditions and compare its false-notification behavior with earlier notification approaches. The modified protocol shows improved resilience to false notifications under the considered noise model while preserving the anonymity goals of the notification process. We further discuss how this notification layer can support machine-learning-assisted quantum-augmented networks by enabling receivers to prepare for quantum-payload handling without relying on context-bearing packet headers. This reduces header-based information leakage and limits targeted interference at compromised switches, making anonymous notification a useful coordination layer for practical hybrid quantum-classical networks.
1 Introduction
Quantum communication is one of the key aspects of the quantum internet, similar to how communication is an integral part of the current age internet. Current age quantum internet research faces several scalability issues that are similar to early models of the internet. In addition to scalability issues, the practical realization of quantum protocols faces several hardware issues. All the initial work regarding quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols, such as BB84 () and B92 (), is based on ideal single-photon sources. However, ideal single-photon sources are not practical. This has been worked out by using other imperfect single-photon sources, such as heralded spontaneous parametric down-conversion (SPDC), to simulate single-photon sources (). Several works pointed out the usefulness of the multiphoton approach as a possible solution to challenges associated with single-photon sources (; ; ). Multiphoton QKD protocols have been studied as a possible solution to noise such as decoherence, bit-flip, and phase-flip (). However, problems associated with the multiphoton approach include a higher risk of siphoning attacks and lower key rates due to increased occupancy of bandwidth (the same number of bits has more corresponding qubits), etc. (). Therefore, we must study other possible solutions to noise in quantum devices that can address both the security and scalability issues. One such approach can be designing quantum communication protocols that have inbuilt error correction codes ().
Quantum-augmented networks (QuANets) are a recent development leading to a scalable and practical idea of a global quantum internet that combines several quantum primitives, such as quantum anonymous notification (QAN) protocols, quantum key distribution, and quantum secure direct communication, into several currently existing classical infrastructures (). As quantum components remain plagued by noise, such as decoherence and attenuation, the scalability of purely quantum networks is severely limited. These noises reduce the fidelity of the quantum states over large distances. The preliminary QuANet model used in this article was proposed by . Figure 1 describes the working of this model. It consists of three stages (): (1) An ML classifier assigns a privacy label to each message, determining whether there is any private content, (2) selectively encrypting the message using quantum encryption if it has any private content, (3) transmitting the message packet, which then reaches its destination. The outgoing packet in this method consists of the following parts: (1) a header, which considers information regarding classical or quantum encryption and addresses, and (2) a payload, which can be a quantum-encrypted or classical-encrypted payload. There are certain core vulnerabilities of this approach, especially in the case of networks having compromised switches.
A critical vulnerability in this QuANet arises from the possibility of compromised switches. In a practical network, we must assume the presence of several compromised switches and a limited number of trusted switches. Considering the above model of QuANet, we consider the class of attacks performed by compromised switches. For example, if we include information on a packet header containing quantum payload, then an attacker can use this information to flag packets having sensitive information, leading to traffic inference attacks. An adversary can selectively attack packets that have a quantum payload by either delaying or dropping them. Attacks could also be based on network monitoring rather than active attacks. Therefore, the practical realization of QuANets depends not only on the robust quantum encryption techniques but also on mitigating several network-level attacks as mentioned above.
1.1 Related works
Based on the above-mentioned issues, we introduce the use of the quantum anonymous notification (QAN) protocol as an extra layer in the quantum-augmented network framework. A general QAN protocol allows a user in the network to anonymously notify any other user in the network using pairs of pre-shared Greenberger–Horne–Zeilinger (GHZ) states (
A major line of work explores anonymous conference key agreement (ACKA) and other related multi-party anonymity primitives as notification-adjacent building blocks. For example,
Large-scale feasibility has also been demonstrated in city-scale experiments involving up to eight users, showing the potential of GHZ and cluster-state-based architectures for practical anonymous communication (
Despite these advances, existing QAN protocols often overlook the impact of environmental noise and decoherence, which can significantly degrade entanglement fidelity and, consequently, the reliability of anonymity verification. In this work, we propose an improved QAN protocol that uses rotation operations to introduce a phase change that results in a parity flip after measurement by the receiver. This modified QAN protocol shows a lower probability of false notifications in the case of channel noise. The main contributions of this work are follows:
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The QAN protocol has been studied under two types of dephasing noise models, while providing anonymity to both the user and the receiver.
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The integration mechanism with QuANet is presented.
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This integration addresses a key vulnerability: context-bearing headers that reveal the presence of quantum payloads and enable targeted interference. This integration makes “switch independence” possible, in which the receiver can allow for a switch-bypass in case of an anonymous notification. This reduces contextual leakage at compromised switches, limits possible adversarial traffic selection, and preserves end-point anonymity.
This remainder of this article is structured as follows. Section 2 defines the quantum anonymous protocol and provides a test case showing the working of this protocol. In this section, we also present simulation results for the working of the QAN protocol, a comparison of the accuracy of our improved QAN protocol with older approaches under noise models, and analyze two possible attacks on this system. Section 4.1 integrates the idea of quantum-augmented networks with the use of a quantum anonymous protocol, providing a foundation for future work on integrating these ideas into a full communication stack.
2 Methods
2.1 The quantum anonymous notification protocol
Several approaches to quantum networks are based on quantum voting (
In an earlier work (
Step 1Distributing GHZ states.We assume the network constitutes of users , and each party distributes one partite GHZ state among the parties as follows:They then send exactly one qubit to each of the other parties, along with the local index. Concretely, when party sends a qubit to party , they are tagged as of .
Thus, the recipient
learns both
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Which GHZ state it came from , and
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Which position in that state they hold ,
without ever learning the full bijection . We denote that qubit by , which is the user’s share of .
Step 2Set up the distributed angle .This is one of the most important steps toward the final execution of the QAN. For each GHZ state , a global angle is selected and split into secret shares using quantum secret sharing. Each party receives a sub-share such that,This ensures that no single party learns the complete value of any .
Step 3Apply the rotation operator to the qubit.Each party applies a local rotation to their qubit in every GHZ state .However, if a party is the notifier (e.g., Alice) and wishes to notify an anonymous receiver associated with the GHZ state index , then for , Alice modifies her rotation,This phase shift, , allows for a change in the parity for the receiver to detect a notification while still preserving the anonymity of the notifier.
Step 4Apply a Hadamard gate and perform a measurement. After applying the Hadamard to each qubit and measuring in the computational basis to obtain bitsuser takes all bits (including ) and applies a private random permutation before broadcasting. In other words, they broadcastSo that neither other users nor eavesdroppers can determine which bit was the self-measurement bit for any particular user.
Step 5Calculate the post-measurement parity. Once every user has broadcast permuted bits, each node collects the full multi-set of bits for . They then compute the global parity:Summing over all (including the self-measurement bit). This ensures that the parity truly reflects all measurement outcomes, so a flip in round signals a notification for user .
Step 6Repeat the method.Each party checks the parity value for each GHZ state. The intended receiver (Bob) would check his GHZ index and calculate . If in any round, Bob would conclude that he received a notification.
presents a schematic representation of the working of the modified QAN protocol. The QAN protocol can broadly be divided into four stages, as represented in
. In the previous approach of the QAN protocol (as by
), all the users in the network know the qubit index assigned to each user. However, distributing
and
-partite GHZ states with known qubit assignments compromises overall anonymity. To address this, we modify the approach such that each user distributes their own set of
-partite GHZ states for which the user assignments are only known to the distributor. We show that this preserves the anonymity of both the sender and the receiver, even if we consider the network consisting of semi-honest parties.
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Each user in the network shares one -partite GHZ state, and for the GHZ state shared by user , they know the indexing for each qubit and user in the network (as explained in the next section).
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The secret share of the angle is only done once; this shall be used throughout all the GHZ states.
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Now, if Alice wants to notify Bob in the network, she will use the partite GHZ state shared by her, such that she knows which qubit corresponds to Bob. Every other user would operate on all the partite GHZ states they own, except the one that they shared.
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Everyone would measure all these GHZ states and finalize the QAN protocol.
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Upon measurement and final exclusive OR (XOR) calculation, Bob would find a notification from the state Alice shared, and nothing from the other states.

Schematic diagram representing different stages of the outlined QAN protocol. The diagram shows a network having -users. A represents Alice, and all other nodes are marked as each of them is equally likely to be the receiver of the notification from Alice. Stage I distributes the secret share of the angle and the GHZ state. Stage II represents each node holding a state and waiting to perform the relevant rotation operation. Stages I and II consist of steps 1 and 2 from the detailed protocol description below. Stage III represents the execution of the QAN. Green nodes show the application of , and yellow nodes show no rotation application. Stage III shows a schematic representation of Steps 3 through 5, that is, until measurement is performed. Stage IV is the final stage of the QAN protocol, in which Bob’s node (the receiver, marked by ) is highlighted in blue, and every other node is marked by red, which is Step 5 of the protocol, in which only the designated receiver has the notification. This signifies that Bob identifies a notification upon doing the post-measurement parity calculation. This diagram gives the user a visual idea about the working of the protocol, with detailed protocol steps explained subsequently.
2.2 Example case: 3-user network
We consider a basic network consisting of three users: Alice, Bob, and Charlie. The exact steps would be as follows:
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Each of them prepares and distributes a partite GHZ state,
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Alice distributes GHZA; Charlie receives one qubit, Bob receives one, and she keeps one herself.
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Bob distributes GHZB, sending qubits to Alice and Charlie.
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Charlie distributes GHZC, similarly sharing qubits.
Each of these users knows the qubit mapping for the GHZ state they shared. So, for , only Alice knows the mapping,
-
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If Alice wants to inform Bob: she uses , that is, the GHZ state she prepared, and applies the modified rotation with probability for the index corresponding to Bob. For the other two GHZ states, and , Alice applies only the normal rotation .
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Bob and Charlie perform a similar rotation except the one they created; that is, Bob does not do anything with , and Charlie does not do anything with .
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Hadamard operation and measurement. Each party does the following:
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Applies Hadamard to all GHZ qubits they own.
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Measures them on a computational basis.
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Publicly shares the measurement outcomes.
-
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For each GHZ state, the parity is computed:where is the measurement bit from user on GHZj.
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Bob receives the notification. Bob measures the parity from all the GHZ states he received, that is, from Alice and Charlie. He should see a notification from one of the GHZ states that he received.
This example can be extended to an -user network, and the generalized protocol is presented in Algorithm 1.
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procedure QAN_PROTOCOL () ⊳ is the notifier’s user index, is the GHZ index to notify.
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for each user do ⊳ Rotation phase
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for each GHZ index do
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ifthen
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⊳ Skip your own GHZ
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else if and then ⊳ Notifier injecting notification
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With probability : apply
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With probability : apply
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else ⊳ All other cases
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Apply
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end if
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end for
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end for
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⊳ Hadamard, measurement, and broadcast
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for each user do
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Apply Hadamard to each qubit
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Measure to get bits
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Broadcast all for which
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end for
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⊳ Parity computation and local notification check
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for each GHZ index do
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Compute
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Let be the receiver slot for
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if and current user then
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User concludes “Notification received.”
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end if
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end for
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end procedure
3 Results
In this section, we present the simulation results based on Algorithm 1, with specific parameters presented in Table 1, along with the noise models used, and some possible attacks on the modified QAN system. The values were selected to represent low, medium, and high notification actuation probabilities, respectively, enabling evaluation of protocol behavior across different operating regimes. Before presenting the simulation outcomes, we briefly discuss the theoretical basis underlying the expected results. The notification detection process in the QAN protocol depends on the interference of shared GHZ states, in which local phase rotations determine whether the receiver observes a parity flip. Channel noise, modeled through dephasing and depolarizing effects, reduces the coherence of these GHZ states and thereby lowers the contrast between notification and no-notification cases. The performance of GHZ-based communication schemes is strongly influenced by the fidelity and coherence of the entangled states used, as discussed in earlier works on noisy multipartite entanglement and quantum communication (
| Parameter | Value(s) | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Secret angle shares | No net pre-rotation on the initial state; sets baseline phase to zero | |
| Number of users | 4 | Network of four parties |
| Notification phase kick | Additional probabilistic rotation applied at the receiver index | |
| Rounds per experiment | [1,9] | Used to observe how the detection probability accumulates with repetitions |
| Notifier actuation probability | Probability that the notifier applies on the receiver’s index in a round |
3.1 Simulation results
For simulation, we focus on the GHZ state shared by the notifier, Alice, in an network. Through these simulations, we present the performance of our proposed QAN protocol and the comparison of the modified QAN protocol to the protocol presented by

Simulation results for QAN protocol outlined in Section 2 for detection probability of notification received for an increasing number of runs for different values of , that is, the probability of application of the rotation operator by the notifier for the receiver index.

This figure shows the false positive rate of notification detection in the presence of noise models mentioned above for the modified QAN protocol proposed in this work, compared to the QAN presented by
Figure 3 shows the curves for three different values of for increasing numbers of . In this figure, we have plotted the probability of a notification detected by the intended receiver when the sender applied the rotation for receiver index qubit with a probability of , plotted against the number of repetitions of QAN rounds, .
Figure 3 shows that for the increased value of the probability of rotation application, the detection of notification by the receiving party improves significantly. We notice that we can find a middle-ground between increasing values and values to optimize the overall notification detection probability. Figure 5 illustrates that the QAN protocol preserves user anonymity. The axis shows the flipper index, that is, the qubit index for a possible notifier or receiver. The axis shows the outcome index, which shows the combined bit-string obtained by measuring the GHZ state, and the axis presents the probability of different outcome strings when measured by different flipper indices (i.e., users). The protocol achieves a high notification detection rate across various and values while maintaining notifier anonymity, as shown in the figures mentioned above.

The probability distribution of different states in the QAN protocol shows a uniform distribution. It, thus, preserves the anonymity of the notifier. Here, we plotted the probability distribution of various strings averaged over 1,000 simulation runs.
3.2 Noise integration
To study the extent of the effectiveness of the protocol, we introduce depolarizing noise models and present the comparison of the false positive notification detection in our modified QAN approach (using rotation operators) vs. the QAN protocol presented by
. The dephasing noise model is explored because it sets the detection gap and, therefore, how many rounds are needed for reliable detection on real links. Depolarizing noise is also an appropriate model for the quantum components considered in this work as it captures the aggregate effects of imperfect single and two-qubit gate operations, control inaccuracies, and residual channel interference commonly observed in near-term quantum hardware. For this simulation, we used the following noise model:
For a single qubit gate,
(
is a possible unitary matrix operator, such as a rotation operator) is applied as
where
2. Two-qubit depolarizing noise:
For the controlled-X (CX) gate, a two-qubit depolarizing channel is applied as
where
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is the density matrix of the quantum state
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is the probability of a depolarizing noise channel being applied (for simulation we used ).
-
represent the 15 non-identity two-qubit Pauli operators (, , , etc.).
While the simulation results focus on a network of users, the proposed QAN protocol naturally generalizes to larger networks. The quantum resource overhead scales as because each of the users distributes one -partite GHZ state. The communication complexity scales quadratically as each user broadcasts measurement outcomes associated with all received GHZ states.
3.3 Attacks
The anonymity of the users participating in the QAN protocol mentioned in the above section can be analyzed for some attacks in which we consider semi-honest participants and compromised users. Here, we show that even if we consider all the users in the network to be semi-honest, the anonymity of any sender and receiver is preserved.
3.3.1 Assuming semi-honest parties
We assume the set of users to be . For each user , we consider a partite GHZ state represented as follows:which is prepared and distributed by user . The user has an associated secret mapping , which lets them know which qubit belongs to which user in the system. This can be written as
This shows the mapping (bijective mapping) of each qubit in belongs to one user. This mapping, as mentioned, is only known to the distributor, .
Now, we consider a general notifier, , and a general receiver, . The user will use , that is, the state they distributed. For the secret mapping, , there exists a unique index, , such that
During the QAN stage, every party modifies its qubit by applying a rotation operator (), where is the secret share of angle distributed to each user in the network. However, the notifier modifies the rotation on her qubit in position by applying a rotation of with a probability of . All other parties, upon receiving their qubits from , apply the standard .
After the Hadamard gate application and measurement is taken (in computational basis), all parties declare the result for the qubit, that is, every other qubit except their index. Let be the measurement outcome for qubit, so the global parity is defined as
In an ideal no-noise scenario, for the no-notification case, , with a high probability. However, for a case when notifier wants to notify , the changes to 1 with some probability. It is important to note here that only the receiver can identify the parity change for the qubit associated with them. Even if semi-honest users, that is, users who try to gain information from publicly shared data, are not able to identify any local parity change, which only can calculate.
3.3.2 Compromised user
Consider a network with compromised users, such that . We consider one of the compromised users to be . A similar argument can be used to show that the anonymity of the sender and receiver is preserved, unless the compromised party is the sender. However, even in this case, where is the sender, the only information she can gain by publication announcement is the index of the receiver. However, no further information can be obtained by outsiders, even if half of the users in the system are compromised because each user has a different secret mapping.
However, a system with many compromised users can cause some issues with the overall working of the system. Because the QAN step comes before transmission of an actual quantum-encrypted message, a compromised node can apply random rotations to random indices to disrupt the overall parity of the system. Thus, this disruption must be taken care of in the long run for practical deployments.
In practical hardware implementations, the fidelity of shared GHZ states may degrade due to gate errors, loss, and decoherence. A small decrease in initial fidelity would slightly lower the contrast between the notification and no-notification cases. This means the detection probability decreases marginally, while the false positive rate shows a small increase. Although a detailed quantitative analysis is beyond the scope of the current article, this trend follows the expected behavior of multipartite GHZ states under noise-heavy conditions and emphasizes the importance of maintaining high state-preparation fidelity for reliable network performance.
4 Discussion
A modified QAN protocol has been presented in this work. Its performance has been validated through several experiments, and security under several plausible attacks has also been studied. Now, we will discuss how this QAN protocol can be integrated with the QuANet framework, such that we can achieve some protection from compromised switches in a network by achieving switch independence.
4.1 Integrating QAN with the QuANet framework
The integration of the QAN protocol with the quantum-augmented network (QuANet) protocol helps us address some of the key security weaknesses of the QuANet structure. The QuANet framework presented by
uses machine learning classifiers to assign a privacy label to each outgoing communication. If a communication contains some private content, then quantum encryption is used to transmit it securely over the network. This quantum-encrypted payload is sent in a packet with quantum and classical headers, as outlined by
. However, having such packets flagged as “quantum encrypted” can create security concerns if switches are compromised. A high-level schematic diagram for the protocol is also presented in
. The three main steps of this integration are as follows.
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ML-based privacy classifier: determines whether a message contains any private content. The definition of “privacy” is user-dependent and can include personal, medical, and financial identifiers.
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Quantum anonymous notification protocol: Whether any message is classified as having private content should be triggered by the sender (referred to as Alice across this work). The receiver (Bob) should receive a notification.
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The receiver (Bob) informs the switch to bypass incoming packets directly to the quantum gateway, where the quantum payload can be processed. This avoids the switch to interact with the packet, such as interacting with the packet header.

Schematic diagram of the combined protocol that integrates the QAN protocol into the idea of a quantum-augmented network presented by
The integration of the QAN protocol with the QuANet framework is formally presented in Algorithm 2. The protocol begins with an ML-based decision procedure that evaluates the privacy level of a composed message M. If the message is classified as non-private (L = 0), classical encryption is applied before transmission. Otherwise, if the message is deemed private (L = 1), the quantum anonymous notification (QAN) protocol is invoked.
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procedure ML-BASED DECISION
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Compose message .
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⊳ : non-private; : private.
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ifthen
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Apply classical encryption to .
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Transmit .
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return.
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else
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Proceed to the QAN protocol.
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end if
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end procedure
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procedure QUANTUM ANONYMOUS NOTIFICATION
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Assumption: GHZ states are pre-distributed.
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Alice triggers QAN to notify Bob.
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QAN is executed by the network.
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end procedure
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procedure SWITCH BYPASS ACTIVATION
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Route subsequent packets directly to the quantum gateway.
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end procedure
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procedure PACKET ARRIVAL
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Packet with quantum payload arrives at the quantum gateway
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Decryption and measurement done
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end procedure
By using this integrated approach to a quantum-augmented network, the protocol achieves switch independence, which is particularly beneficial in cases where there are compromised switches in the system. This also allows us to remove any information from the packet headers that identifies any packets with private contents, that is, a quantum-encrypted payload. This would help us reduce any directed attacks by adversaries as a result of these compromised switches in the network.
4.2 Conclusion
In this work, we presented an improved QAN protocol that can be easily integrated with a QuANet framework. The proposed QAN protocol uses quantum secret sharing to establish a secret share of the angle that every user in the system holds, which is then modified by any sender to anonymously notify the receiver using pre-shared GHZ states. The integration of QAN with the QuANet framework allows us to modify the pre-proposed structure of message packets, such as headers and payload. The header information from these packets can be exploited by compromised switches to gain some contextual information as this framework uses selective quantum encryption for messages containing private information. The adversaries can thus use such information to either delay or drop these packets at these compromised switches. Use of QAN before actual transmission would allow the receivers to bypass incoming messages from the switches and also help in reducing the information that is provided in the headers. This is what we call switch independence.
The simulation results in Figures 3, 5 show that the QAN protocol achieves decent notification detection probability even for smaller rounds . We also present a comparison of the working of our QAN protocol to one of the earlier defined approaches under several noise models. From Figure 4, we can see that the false positive rate for notification detection is significantly different (approximately for any ) for our approach vs. the older one. We also present an analysis for two possible attack scenarios for our QAN protocol and show that the anonymity of the sender–receiver pair is maintained even in the case of all users being semi-honest or users in the system being compromised.
Future work can focus on active attacks, such as rotation poisoning or targeted gate attacks. For example, we consider the last-speaker steering attack. Here, an adversary holds on till they can see others’ broadcasts and then chooses their bit to cause the final parity changes. These attacks can be further avoided by providing each party with certifications and signatures to avoid this class of attacks. If we consider the case of a rotation poisoning attack by a single compromised node that slightly perturbs its local rotation each round, we notice that the shared GHZ coherence degrades, false notification events become more likely, true notifications are harder to confirm, and convergence slows as the network size increases. A simple mitigation is to randomize local bases across rounds, watch for sudden decreases in measured coherence, and aggregate a few rounds by majority vote so one misbehaving node cannot drive the outcome.
These modifications to the QuANet architecture not only increase the overall security of the system but also provide us with a scalable and more robust framework than the stand-alone QuANet framework. Future work can look at network simulation for this work to gain more insights into possible bottlenecks and shortcomings in a fully-fledged network scenario. There are, however, some limitations of this work that must be further studied. These limitations include analysis of fidelity of sharing GHZ states under noise-heavy hardware, a more thorough analysis of the performance of switch independence in different network configurations, and thus, development of any further protocols, which can streamline the integration of our QAN protocols with other quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) protocols necessary for quantum secure communication (
Statements
Data availability statement
The original contributions presented in the study are included in the article/supplementary material, further inquiries can be directed to the corresponding author.
Author contributions
NJ: Conceptualization, Formal analysis, Investigation, Methodology, Validation, Visualization, Writing – original draft, Writing – review and editing. AP: Conceptualization, Formal analysis, Funding acquisition, Project administration, Resources, Supervision, Validation, Writing – review and editing, Data curation, Investigation, Methodology, Software, Visualization. MS: Conceptualization, Funding acquisition, Project administration, Supervision, Validation, Writing – review and editing, Data curation, Formal analysis, Investigation, Methodology, Resources, Software, Visualization.
Funding
The author(s) declared that financial support was received for this work and/or its publication. This work is partly sponsored by the National Science Foundation (NSF) awards #2324924 and #2324925.
Conflict of interest
The author(s) declared that this work was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Generative AI statement
The author(s) declared that generative AI was not used in the creation of this manuscript.
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Summary
Keywords
quantum anonymous notification, quantum anonymous protocols, quantum augmented networks, quantum key distribution, quantum secret sharing, quantum secure direct communication
Citation
Jha N, Parakh A and Subramaniam M (2026) An improved quantum anonymous notification protocol for quantum-augmented networks. Front. Quantum Sci. Technol. 5:1704298. doi: 10.3389/frqst.2026.1704298
Received
12 September 2025
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© 2026 Jha, Parakh and Subramaniam.
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*Correspondence: Nitin Jha, njha1@students.kennesaw.edu
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